We begin this publication with the first part of a series built on a year-long investigation: dozens of hours of interviews, months of document review, and thousands of kilometers travelled to follow a trail that crosses Russia, Turkey, Europe, and beyond. It is a project in the same spirit as our earlier special investigations — tracing hidden assets, front companies, and political protection networks — but this time focused on one of the most notorious criminals to present himself as a businessman in post-Soviet Russia: Telman Ismailov.
Telman Ismailov, born in 1956 in Baku, rose from modest beginnings to become one of the most flamboyant businessmen of post-Soviet Russia. Through his conglomerate, AST Group, he built an empire spanning wholesale trade, real estate, entertainment, and hospitality. At its height, AST controlled more than twenty companies and ran Moscow’s notorious Cherkizovsky Market, the largest bazaar in Eastern Europe.
AST Group: A Network of Companies
At various points, Ismailov’s Russian portfolio included at least over twenty firms, among them:
OOO AST-Gold OOO AST-Telekom OOO AST-Trans OOO AST-Amoroli Impeks OOO AST-Trans Group OOO KBF AST OOO Praga AST OOO AST International Environment OOO Nauchny Potentsial OOO AST-Injiniring OOO AST Muzik OOO AST-Foto i Video OOO AST TUR OOO Slavyanskaya Trapeza OAO AST GOF OOO AST Kapstroi OOO AST Agroprom OOO AST Transervice OOO AST Smolensk OAO Torgoviy Dom TSVUM Stomatologicheskiy Tsentr AST Shishova V. A. i Kompanii Moskovskaya Akademiya Predprinimatelstva Pri Pravitelstve Moscvi
The group was formally headed by Ismailov himself, with sons Alekper and Sarkhan as shareholders and managers, relative Zaur Mardanov as shareholder, and loyal managers distributed across subsidiaries.
The Lifestyle of Moscow’s Patron
By the early 2000s, Ismailov was as famous for his parties as for his business. His banquets became symbols of Russia’s new elite: lavish gatherings blending politics, culture, and entertainment.
International stars — Sharon Stone, Monica Bellucci, Richard Gere, Mariah Carey — were flown in for events. Domestically, leading performers like Dmitri Malikov, Ivan Urgant, Philipp Kirkorov, and many others became part of Ismailov’s circle, invited to Cherkizon-linked galas and private celebrations.
The Organizers Behind the Curtain
The spectacle was orchestrated not just by event managers, but by AST insiders. One was Svetlana Bulatova, then linked to OOO KBF AST.
Her later Facebook connections confirm she was close to the very celebrities who frequented Ismailov’s events. Already in Moscow, Bulatova likely played a dual role: organizing Ismailov’s social life while handling company matters. Years later, she resurfaced in Lugano as Svetlana Moroni, where she became one of Ismailov’s key fiduciaries — structuring his assets in Switzerland and beyond.
Cherkizovsky Market: The Crown Jewel
The sprawling Cherkizovsky Market (Cherkizon) epitomized Ismailov’s rise. Covering 400 hectares, employing 100,000 people, and moving billions annually, it became Moscow’s commercial heart.
But beneath the surface, Cherkizon was described as a state within a state — a hub for contraband, trafficking of all sorts, illegal international payments, counterfeit goods, and customs evasion. Authorities estimated billions in lost duties. Traders, however, often remembered it as orderly and efficient: a market where one could earn a living.
The Okko Documentary
In August 2025, Okko released a three-part series, “Черкизон. Ад и рай новой России” (Cherkizon. Hell and Paradise of New Russia), directed by Vadim Vatagin. The series portrayed Cherkizon as chaotic, frightening, and ruled by its own laws, while allowing interviewees to describe Ismailov as “loyal,” “kind,” or “generous.”
This focus was completely misplaced. The film dwelled on surface-level anecdotes — fire hazards, disorder, one trader’s story of fear — while ignoring the real evil. Cherkizon was not just a bazaar: it was infrastructure for international illegal traffic.
Ismailov was no benevolent patron. He was, in essence, a hard-core criminal who lived off trafficking and people’s suffering. In contrast to Okko’s narrative, many traders we interviewed recalled Cherkizon as safe and functional on the surface — precisely because it was engineered to hide its true purpose as a mega-hub for contraband. Even after Cherkizon’s closure, one of AST’s most profitable arms quietly continued minting billions.
Collapse of Cherkizon and AST
In June 2009, authorities abruptly shut down Cherkizon, citing fire hazards and counterfeit goods. Unofficially, it marked the fall of Mayor Luzhkov’s protection and a shift in Moscow’s political economy.
AST’s revenues collapsed. Subsidiaries were dissolved, bankrupted, or transferred abroad. Assets migrated not only to Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Turkey, and Cyprus, but also to France and Italy, where Ismailov’s network has been already buying properties and integrating into international trafficking.
After the Shutdown: The Alcohol Machine Kept Running
Despite the 2009 collapse of Cherkizon, criminal cases, and the public impression that Ismailov’s Russian empire had vanished, parts of the business quietly kept operating and not on a small scale. One of the key vehicles was OOO AST-International Environment, AST’s arm for wholesale alcohol distribution.
Originally its shareholders included Alekper Ismailov, Sarkhan Ismailov, Telman Ismailov and Zaur Mardanov, alongside managers Leonid Rafailov and Simandu Simanduev. By the mid-to-late 2010s, as the Ismailov sons became entangled in creditor claims, formal control shifted to Leonid Rafailov.
Public filings show the company remained extremely profitable:
2023 revenue ~₽18.5 bn, profit ~₽2.7 bn, no tax arrears.
2024 revenue ~₽25.2 bn, keeping it among the top Moscow wholesalers.
The timing of shareholder changes, coinciding with the sons’ litigations, and the scale of ongoing profits suggest the “takeover” was likely formal rather than substantive. The alcohol business continued to benefit the Ismailov circle, even as the family’s name disappeared from registries. As of today, the company is still active.
After Cherkizon: Push into Ukraine and Kazakhstan (2010–2015)
When Moscow shut down Cherkizovsky Market, Telman Ismailov did not retreat into silence. Instead, he went looking for new territories where his formula of vast bazaars could be replanted. Between 2010 and 2015 he travelled to Ukraine at least forty times, splitting his movements between Kiev — where he cultivated ties with the Yanukovich clan — and Odessa, whose port had long been a hub for contraband. He also opened a flank in Kazakhstan, hoping to anchor himself in Central Asia’s commercial circuits.
Kazakhstan: Silk Road ambitions with Mashkevich
The first ambition took shape in Kazakhstan. Sources from the period describe Ismailov’s attempt to launch a market branded Zhibek Zholy (“Silk Road”) together with Alexander Mashkevich, the billionaire co‑owner of Eurasian Resources Group and at the time president of AO Evraziiski Bank. The project collapsed within a year and passed into the control of a Mashkevich‑linked European entity, but the intent is clear: after Cherkizon, Ismailov tried to plant his bazaar under the wing of Kazakhstan’s business elite.
The paperwork strengthens the link. Sarkhan Ismailov was registered at ul. Gornaya 448A, apt. 4, Almaty — a flat owned since 2008 by a Kazakh citizen, listed as an affiliated person of AO Evraziiski Bank and described in filings with AO SK Evrazia as the mother of one of the bank’s executives. The bank itself was presided over by Mashkevich. The registered address ties the Ismailov family directly into the banking world that underpinned the Zhibek Zholy venture.
Ukraine: Odessa’s Usatove cluster
In Odessa, the vehicle was TOV Oleksandria‑Stroi (EDRPOU 34643184), a construction and real estate firm managed by Oleksandr Reznik and registered at Ul. Zaliznichnykiv, 2, Usatove. Its shareholders were Semaflex Limited (Cyprus), Nuhorne Limited (BVI), Bioreed Limited (Cyprus), and Baaz Yusufovich Baazov, a businessman whose name had circulated in Russian press as linked to Cherkizovsky. Corporate filings identify the end‑beneficiaries as Argyris Argyrou for Semaflex, Constantinos Koudellaris for Nuhorne, and Musa Arbievich Paizulaev for Bioreed.
Around the same street number, three more companies filled out what looked like a market cluster: AST Ukrstroi (EDRPOU 34943970) at Ul. Zaliznichnykiv 8A/2, owned by Baazov and managed by Oleg Ilchenko; TOV Torgovyi Tsentr Klevernyi (EDRPOU 38617650) at 8A/3, owned and managed by Reznik; and TOV Mizhnarodnyi Tsentr City Food (EDRPOU 38617687) at 8A/4, also under Reznik. The duplication of addresses suggests a deliberate build‑out of a Cherkizon‑style bazaar complex on Odessa’s edge.
Between 2011 and 2012, Oleksandria-Stroi imported construction materials from Turkey — a country where Telman Ismailov had built especially strong ties during the Cherkizon era. The vendors included Kat-Kar Muhendislik and Optimal Kuyumculuk of the Sevindik Group, Vefa Prefabrike from Istanbul, and Guner Ticaret, a PVC and aluminium trading company founded by Suleyman Guner in Antalya. Guner Ticaret’s products — mainly for hotels, offices, and residential construction — included aluminium carpets and photocell doors manufactured for Rixos Premium, part of the Rixos Hotels chain founded by Fettah Tamince. These Turkish vendors shipped metals, cement, prefabricated units, plastics, and doors into Odessa.
Here the connections begin to overlap. Turkish press has reported that the Sevindik owners, Hakan Kati and Ekrem Unal Sevindik, as well as Rixos founder Fettah Tamince, have been cited as suspected members of the Fetullah Gulen Organization (FETO). This placed the Odessa suppliers in the same political and business orbit as the hotelier who later assumed control of Ismailov’s Mardan Palace.
That transfer itself was contentious. When Rixos took over management of the Antalya hotel, Turkish press and creditors speculated that the so-called confiscation had in fact been a friendly arrangement at a dumping price, structured to mislead creditors. The fact that Rixos suppliers like Guner Ticaret had already been tied into Ismailov’s procurement networks years earlier lends weight to that suspicion.
The offshore structures behind Oleksandria‑Stroi also show the signature of Ismailov’s trusted consultants. Nuhorne Limited (BVI) was reportedly registered by Menwin Secretarial Services Limited, a firm that recurs throughout his offshore architecture. Semaflex Limited, later dissolved, was managed in its final years by Tatiana Koudellari — likely the wife of Constantinos Koudellaris — and shared its Cypriot address with Chevrex Limited, now controlled by Yulia Gaydukova, another recurring figure in Ismailov’s network.
Musa Paizulaev, listed as the beneficiary of Bioreed, surfaces as an assistant to State Duma deputy Adam Delimkhanov, a man at the center of Ramzan Kadyrov’s Chechen power network. Paizulaev appears to function less as an independent businessman than as a proxy for Delimkhanov’s interests. In this light, his role in Oleksandria-Stroi suggests the project may be qualified as a joint venture between Delimkhanov and Ismailov, rather than a purely private development.
The partnership echoes earlier episodes. Turkish and Israeli press reported that Arkadiy Gaydamak was preparing to sell the Israeli football club Beitar Jerusalem to a consortium that included Telman Ismailov, Adam Delimkhanov, and Kazakh businessman Kenes Rakishev. The deal collapsed only after Beitar fans staged mass protests. Though aborted, the episode illustrates how Delimkhanov and Ismailov had already been aligned in foreign acquisitions, extending their business cooperation beyond Russia.
The Odessa project therefore carried the same hallmark as Cherkizon: markets constructed not just with suppliers and developers, but underwritten by political patrons and security muscle.
Legacy of the Russian Chapter
Cherkizon symbolized both the opportunities and the lawlessness of the 1990s. For Ismailov, it was both foundation and downfall.
Its true legacy is structural: Ismailov built infrastructure for illegal international trade. The bazaars and malls were covers, logistics hubs designed to move goods — licit and illicit. When chased out of Russia, he repeated the pattern elsewhere:
Ukraine and Kazakhstan: markets and malls.
Turkey: Mardan Palace and Olimpus.
USA: Las Vegas shopping centers.
Montenegro: Casino Avala.
UK, Germany, Czech Republic and Swtizerland: courier and food delivery firms fronting for trafficking.
Like metastases, each venture was a variation on the same model — a new “market” front for trafficking.
If you have any information about Telman Ismailov or the companies and individuals associated with it, please contact us at support@researchinitiative.org. Your input could greatly assist our ongoing investigation.
Our thanks go to the team at https://AssetTracing.com for their assistance in preparing this investigation
© 2024 ResearchInitiative. All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the ResearchInitiative, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law.