What initially appeared to be a case of financial mismanagement at AB Bank quickly unraveled into a sophisticated fraud scheme involving multiple key figures across several jurisdictions. The scandal revolves around the bank’s financial dealings with Pinnacle Global Fund, a Singapore-based entity, and a suspicious Wakala Agreement. But as investigations unfolded, it became evident that AB Bank’s leadership was not just a victim—it was complicit in an intricate financial fraud.
At the heart of the scheme were several high-profile individuals: Abdus Samad Muhammad Khan, Khurram Abdullah, Saiful Haque, Barry Swayn, Mahad Mohamud, Ali Wazir, Gerard Kevin Samy, and Jaime Alfonso Ordonez Arturo. Each played a pivotal role in orchestrating, executing, or facilitating the movement of illicit funds.
The Initial Fraud: How AB Bank Became Both Perpetrator and Victim
The case began on November 26, 2013, when AB Bank entered into a Wakala Agreement with Pinnacle Global Fund (PGF), advancing a $20 million loan. The funds were meant to be held in an escrow account—the Cheng Bao account—until an $80 million loan could be secured from Middle Eastern financial institutions. However, by February 2014, the money had vanished after being transferred to ADCB (Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank).
While AB Bank executives claimed they were defrauded, further investigations revealed their direct involvement in the embezzlement. High-ranking officials colluded with external actors to siphon and launder the funds across multiple jurisdictions, exposing a deeply embedded network of financial deception.
The Key Figures Behind the Scheme
Saiful Haque
Saiful Haque, a Bangladeshi businessman, was connected to the chairman of AB Bank and appeared to be one of the key figures in the fraudulent scheme. He had engaged his associate and a longtime university friend from when they both studied in Canada – Khurram Abdullah, to assist AB Bank as a self-proclaimed Sharia law expert. Saiful Haque and Khurram Abdullah were close associates of Abdus Samad Khan, as Abdullah had introduced Khan to AB Bank, and the three of them had attended several meetings together. Saiful Haque had signed a consultant agreement between AB Bank and his company, Atlantic Enterprises, to receive fees for this introduction. The company was based in Bangladesh but used a bank account in Jersey.
Saiful Haque was a director at The General Electric Co in Bangladesh. Through this company, he had been a member of the Foreign Investors’ Chamber of Commerce & Industry, Bangladesh (FICCI Organization). Saiful Haque was also the founder and president of the MOVE Foundation, a non-profit organization in Bangladesh created by professionals as a platform for youth development. He was also a director at Sky Apparrels Limited and had previously served as a director at Standard Chartered Bank for 13 years.
Both PGF and First Reliance Capital (FRC), two entities central to the fraudulent scheme, were registered at the same address: 6 Battery Road, 15-03, Singapore. This location was also the previous address of Standard Chartered Bank, where Saiful Haque had held a directorial position for over a decade. His long-standing experience in banking and finance, coupled with his extensive network, positioned him as a key enabler in facilitating financial transactions linked to the fraud. His association with Atlantic Enterprises further implicates him in the scheme, as consultancy fees were funneled through this company.
Although Saiful Haque was interrogated in connection with the fraudulent scheme involving AB Bank and PGF, the authorities took no further action. He was not charged or penalized.
Abdus Samad Muhammad Khan
Abdus Samad Muhammad Khan was another central figure in the fraud. He was introduced to AB Bank by Khurram Abdullah as the Director of Castle Capital Canada Inc. and Cheng Bao General Trading LLC in the UAE. Additionally, he was presented as a key figure behind PGF, further solidifying his credibility in financial circles.
He worked closely with Khurram Abdullah, James Ordonez, and Ali Wazir to create an intricate web of deception. He engaged with FRC in Singapore, presenting himself as a representative of potential co-investors. However, his investment proposals were vague and non-traditional, ultimately failing to convince FRC to engage in any transactions. Despite this, Khan and his associates continued to fabricate documents linking FRC to fraudulent dealings.
Khan also utilized falsified company affiliations and misleading addresses to obscure his true activities. Castle Capital Canada, a company where he was listed as CFO, had multiple conflicting addresses, possibly to create confusion and avoid scrutiny. His other entity, Cheng Bao General Trading, was linked to Castle Capital Canada as its sister company, further entangling the fraudulent network across different jurisdictions.
Moreover, Khan was actively involved in financial crimes related to UM Financial Inc. and Aya Financial Inc. in Canada. In a strategic move, he registered UMF Investments, a company with a name nearly identical to UM Financial Inc., the entity he sought to defraud. During this period, he collaborated with associates who had legal and financial expertise, helping him in misappropriating funds. By exploiting his prior access to confidential financial information, he facilitated fraudulent transactions and directed misappropriated funds into newly created accounts, including those of Aya Financial and UMF Investments.
Mr. Khan is a Canadian citizen. In the UAE he may be known as Abdus Samad Mohammed Al Bach, reprotedly this name was used to register Abdus Khan’s direct line in the UAE in 2016. Previous allegations of fraud against him in Canada further highlight his history of financial misconduct. Tufail Qadir filed a lawsuit against Castle Capital Canada Inc, Abdus Samad Khan and Mahad Mohamud. In 2009 UM Financial Inc and Aya Financial Inc filed a lawsuit against Abdus Samad Khan et al (Kaleem Khan, Rehan Saeed, Talal Chehab, UMF Investments).
Khurram Abdullah
Khurram Abdullah was introduced to AB Bank by Saiful Haque as a financial expert with strong connections to Middle Eastern financial institutions. Abdullah played a key role in the fraud and linked the bank to offshore companies that were ultimately used to launder the stolen funds. He also served as the primary intermediary of the Wakala Agreement, receiving consultancy fees for his services. Although this person’s role is well known and has been described in the media, there is no information suggesting that any investigations are conducted against him in connection with fraud involving AB Bank.
Abdullah is a Canadian national with extensive experience in Islamic finance and capital markets. His LinkedIn profile indicates that he is currently the CEO of Tjara Halal Financing, a company offering Sharia-compliant mortgages and business financing solutions across Canada. He also serves as the Managing Director of Securo Investments Group Ltd., a firm that advises governments and large corporations on financial and infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, Europe, and the Americas.
He had previously worked at UM Financial in Canada, the Wall Street firm Smith Barney, and the Hartford Insurance Group in the United States. In 2012, Abdullah was responsible for launching the National Asset Management Limited Sharia Fund, which aimed to promote investments in Sharia-compliant equities listed on the Colombo Stock Exchange. Dar Al Sharia appears to be a reputable Islamic finance advisory group operating globally. As a representative of Dar Al Sharia Abdullah Khurram managed a number of ventures in the Southeast Asia, especially in Sri Lanka and Brunei.
Despite his involvement in the AB Bank money laundering case, Khurram Abdullah appears to have remained professionally active, continuing to expand his financial ventures across multiple regions. The lack of legal scrutiny against him raises concerns about potential regulatory loopholes that allow individuals implicated in financial scandals to continue operating freely in the global finance industry.
Barry Swayn
Barry Swayn was listed as a Director of Castle Capital Canada on the company’s website, yet he has denied any official affiliation with the company, stating that his name may have been used without his consent. This raises the possibility that his identity was deliberately exploited as part of the broader fraud scheme orchestrated by Abdus Samad Muhammad Khan and Khurram Abdullah. However, his connections to key individuals involved in the fraud, as well as his signature on fraudulent documents, suggest that his role warrants further scrutiny.
One of the key elements linking Swayn to the fraudulent activities is his signature on the Wakala Agreement as the CEO and Director of PGF. However, official registry documents confirm that he was never legally registered as the CEO or Director of PGF. This discrepancy suggests either intentional deception or the unauthorized use of his identity to fabricate legitimacy for the fraudulent scheme.
Swayn’s corporate affiliations also indicate potential involvement in the broader scheme. He has known ties to Storm Associates, a company with operations in Dubai. Interestingly, Storm Group companies, which are allegedly affiliated with Swayn, have a structural resemblance to Castle Capital Canada and its associated entities. Furthermore, another company—Castle Capital Investment Limited, registered in Hong Kong—was found to have been registered by the same agent as Storm Signature Developments Group Limited, an entity linked to Storm Associates in Dubai. This suggests a pattern of interconnected businesses that could have been used to facilitate activities across multiple jurisdictions.
His connection to the fraudulent network dates back to at least 2006, when he first encountered Castle Capital Canada through a residential development project in Canada.
Mahad Mohamud
Mahad Mohamud also played an important role in the fraudulent scheme, acting as a key facilitator and intermediary between major players, including Abdus Samad Muhammad Khan, Khurram Abdullah, and Barry Swayn. Official records list Mohamud as the CEO and President of Castle Capital Canada. His longstanding business connections, particularly in the UAE, suggest that he may have played a strategic role in setting up the operational framework necessary for the fraud to be executed across multiple jurisdictions.
One of Mohamud’s most notable contributions to the scheme appears to be his role in introducing Barry Swayn to Castle Capital Canada in 2006. At the time, Swayn was engaged in a residential development project in Canada, and Mohamud—then his client—brought the opportunity to his attention. Mohamud also introduced Swayn to Abdus Samad Khan via email correspondence, further embedding him within the network of fraudulent actors. Over the following years, Mohamud and Swayn continued to collaborate on construction projects between 2006 and 2015.
Mohamud’s potential connections to ADCB Bank raise further concerns about his role in orchestrating the fraudulent financial transactions. According to Barry Swayn, Mohamud likely had links to key individuals within ADCB, including Saiful Haque. These connections may have been leveraged to create the necessary conditions for illicit fund transfers, particularly between Cheng Bao accounts. This aligns with evidence suggesting that Khan and Khurram Abdullah colluded with ADCB staff to manipulate banking processes in their favor.
Ali Wazir
Listed as the Europe Director of Castle Capital Canada on the company’s website, Wazir was reportedly an important intermediary figure, leveraging his connections in Europe and the UK to further the scheme.
Evidence suggests that Wazir was introduced to Swayn by Mohamud, who had known him through family ties. This introduction took place in Dubai during a meeting regarding a potential project, which ultimately did not materialize. However, the fact that Wazir was listed as a director of Castle Capital Canada in Europe suggests that he had a deeper involvement in the company’s operations beyond this one interaction. Given the broader fraudulent activities linked to Castle Capital Canada, his role likely extended to coordinating financial dealings, recruiting investors, or acting as a point of contact for European financial networks.
Additionally, Wazir’s role as a potential intermediary in the PGF dealings further implicates him in fraudulent activities. Gerard Kevin Samy, who interacted with Khan regarding PGF agreements, was reportedly in contact with an intermediary of Pakistani origin residing in the UK. Investigations strongly suggest that this intermediary was Wazir. If confirmed, this would indicate that Wazir played a direct role in brokering investment opportunities and misleading financial agreements. Wazir also introduced Abdus Samad Khan and Jaime Arturo (James Ordonez) to FRC. These introductions occurred at different times (Khan in 2011/12 and Ordonez in 2014), but Wazir served as the common link between them.
Gerard Kevin Samy
As the director and shareholder of FRC, and the former director of PGF between November 5, 2007, and January 31, 2013, Gerard Kevin Samy’s position placed him at the heart of the financial transactions related to these entities. While he has reportedly denied any direct involvement in fraudulent activities, documentary evidence suggests that his firm played a significant role in managing and facilitating the movement of funds tied to the scheme. He was questioned by investigators in 2016, though no substantial legal action has been taken against him so far.
Beyond his role at FRC and PGF, Samy held key positions in multiple entities, including serving as the secretary of Faith Production Pte Ltd and as both the secretary and shareholder of Uzzia Singapore Pte Ltd. Additionally, records from the ICIJ database link him to Singapore’s financial jurisdiction, where an internal account was created by an agent to record miscellaneous charges related to his activities. Furthermore, he is identified as an intermediary of the British Virgin Islands -registered entity Orient East Investment Inc., further highlighting his involvement in offshore financial dealings.
Samy’s direct interactions with Abdus Samad Muhammad Khan also raise questions about his role in the broader fraudulent scheme. He met Khan at the FRC office in Singapore, where Khan, accompanied by an intermediary (Ali Wazir), presented potential co-investors for projects. Although Samy claimed that none of the proposed projects or investments discussed with Khan ever materialized and that he had no further contact with him, his firm’s connections to these figures suggest otherwise.
Jaime Alfonso Ordonez Arturo
Jaime Alfonso was a PGF shareholder and a signatory of the Subscription Agreement for the fund. Ordonez was introduced to PGF through FRC. The intention was for Ordonez to become a shareholder in PGF as part of a joint investment project with PGF’s owner. Initially, Ordonez expressed interest in investing his assets remotely, but FRC representatives insisted on meeting him in person before proceeding. Following this meeting, Ordonez was formally assigned as a shareholder and later became a director of PGF. Despite his formal position within PGF, no funds were ever invested into the company. By 2013-2014, FRC faced outstanding administrative fees related to PGF, prompting an attempt to contact Ordonez regarding the company’s future. When no response was received, FRC decided to shut down PGF and remove it from the Singapore company registry. However, years later, Ordonez attempted to prevent the dissolution of PGF by proposing a new investment of $20 million. After consulting with legal advisors, and according to Kevin Gerard Samy statement, FRC proceeded with closing PGF without the consent of its directors and shareholders, including Ordonez. However, we believe that this $20 million were the same funds siphoned from AB Bank which actually went through the accounts either of FRC or PGF, but Kevin Gerard Samy was trying to cover up for this by making up this alleged “investement”.
Ordonez’s connection to Khan and the broader fraudulent scheme remains complex. While both Ordonez and Khan were introduced to FRC by the same intermediary—believed to be Ali Wazir—FRC representatives claim to have met them separately and as unrelated parties. Documents connected to the fraudulent Wakala Agreement seem to point to his active role in the movement of illicit funds through PGF, although he has not been the subject of any formal legal investigations.
He also reportedly owned Tayrona Capital company, which was described as a “private equity and investment banking boutique” investing in media, hotels, and entertainment. The company has headquarters in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai and operates a number of offices globally including the USA, UK, and Malta.
According to a source who previously worked closely with him, Jaime was further investigated by financial intelligence and anti-terrorism agencies in several jurisdictions, including the USA, Canada, United Kingdom and Singapore.
Recent legal disputes have further reinforced suspicions about Ordonez’s financial activities. In 2019, he and his company Tayrona Pacific Star, a subsidiary of Tayrona Capital, were sued by Swiss art dealer Yves Bouvier in Singapore’s High Court over a failed $60 million deal to acquire Le Freeport, a high-security storage facility for valuable art and assets. Bouvier accused Ordonez and his associates of deliberately stalling the transaction four times. These actions strongly suggest that Ordonez and his company were not acting in good faith and possibly engaged in further financial manipulations.
Given similar pattern of promising investment and then withdrawing we believe that this case was either a cover-up for another hidden fraud or an attempt to a fraud – promising investment and playing big businessman was exactly Ordonez’ modus operandi in AB Bank fraud according to sources who worked with him during that time.
Legal Actions and the Limited Scope of Accountability
Following revelations of financial misconduct, legal proceedings were initiated in 2017, targeting some AB Bank executives, including former Chairman Wahidul Haque. Businessman Saiful Haque was questioned, while others resigned under pressure.
However, the broader network of intermediaries and facilitators largely evaded legal consequences. No comprehensive legal proceedings have been undertaken in Bangladesh or international jurisdictions to hold all key players accountable.
Tayrona, Castle Capital and probably many other faces of the individual responsible or otherwise involved into this fraud, continue to operate and enter business relationship.
An Unfinished Case with Global Implications
The AB Bank fraud case stands as a stark reminder of how financial institutions can be both perpetrators and victims of white-collar crime. While legal actions have been taken against some bank officials, many of the true masterminds behind the scheme remain at large.
It also exemplifies how easily money can be stolen with little consequence for the perpetrators.
If you have any information about AB Bank fraud or any of the protagonists or the companies associated with them, please contact us at support@researchinitiative.org. Your input could greatly assist our ongoing investigation.
Our thanks go to the team at https://AssetTracing.com for their assistance in preparing this investigation
© 2024 ResearchInitiative.org All rights reserved. This publication may not be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means, including photocopying, recording, or other electronic or mechanical methods, without the prior written permission of the ResearchInitiative, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical reviews and certain other non-commercial uses permitted by copyright law.